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Abstract 
 
With an increasing number of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) covering trade in 
services, we explore the impact of PTAs on services trade. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first paper in this literature that endogenizes the impact of services preferentialism in 
estimating the trade effect and also looks at its anticipation effects. We also add to this 
literature by distilling the trade effect of PTAs into that emanating from services and “goods 
only” agreements and further confirm complementarities between the two. Our results suggest 
a trade effect of 15% from having a services accord alone while the total incremental impact of 
a “goods only” agreement is found to be 7.6%. The services trade effect is accentuated to 
59.7% once anticipation effects of services accords are included and such analysis also suggests 
that services agreements seem to have a significant “announcement effect.”    
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1. Introduction 
 
Of the 53 Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) notified to the WTO in the period before 
2000, only nine (16.9%) were notified to the WTO as services agreements. In the years since 
2000 on the other hand, half of the 168 notified-PTAs have covered trade in services. Clearly 
then, more and more trading partners are negotiating services provisions in PTAs which 
suggests both the growing importance of services trade in general and the need to 
institutionalize such trade between countries. The obvious question then is how effective have 
these agreements been in fostering services trade. 
 
Economic literature is replete with theoretical models and empirical analyses documenting the 
impact of PTAs on trade between partner countries. Most of this work, however, has looked at 
trade in merchandise goods only. An important reason for this has been the lack of availability 
of bilateral services trade data. This lacuna has, however, been filled with the publication of the 
OECD’s database on bilateral services trade2; since its publication Grünfeld & Moxnes (2003), 
Kimura (2003), Kimura & Lee (2004, 2006), Lejour & Verheijden (2004), Mirza and Nicoletti 
(2004), Kox & Lejour (2005), Lennon (2006) and Walsh (2006) have used this dataset to assess 
determinants of bilateral services trade using the gravity framework.  
 
However, there is a general lack of consensus and conformity to economic theory in these 
authors' key findings. Grunfeld & Moxnes (2003), for instance, find the impact of PTAs to be 
insignificant. Kimura & Lee (2004) find distance to be more important for services trade while 
Lejour & Verheijden (2004) and Lennon (2006) report the converse to be true. Walsh (2006), 
on the other hand, finds the impact of distance to be insignificant. Similarly, Kimura & Lee 
(2004) find the impact of common language to be insignificant, which is refuted by Lennon 
(2006) and Walsh (2006).     
 
In this paper, we base the gravity model on an intuitive understanding of the determinants of 
bilateral services trade by sector and mode of delivery and thereby generate results that are 
                                                 
2 In 2002, the OECD Secretariat presented data on total trade in services, broken down by partner country, for 26 
OECD member countries over 1999-2002. 
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better validated by economic theory. We add to the literature in this area by distilling the trade 
effects of PTAs into those emanating from services and “goods only” agreements and further 
confirm complementarities between the two. We also study the impact of bilateral trade in 
goods on bilateral services trade more directly than has hitherto been explored in the empirical 
literature. Our analysis also explores the PTA-services trade relationship disaggregated by the 
economic status of the partner countries and by the reciprocity (or lack thereof) of 
commitments. To the best of our knowledge, this is also the first paper in the literature on 
gravity model estimation of services trade that endogenizes the impact of preferentialism in 
estimating the trade effect using advanced estimation techniques and also looks at the 
anticipation effects of services accords.  
 
On the whole, our results suggest a trade effect of 15% from having a services accord alone. 
This effect rises to 32.3% for the intra-EU trading partners in our sample. The incremental 
impact of a “goods only” PTA is found to be 7.6% (services PTAs accounting for one-third of 
this and “goods only” PTAs the rest). We also find both North-North and North-South services 
agreements to generate positive trade effects, which suggests that the associated pattern of trade 
is both intra- and inter-industry. Moreover, within North-South agreements and irrespective of 
the type of the agreement, asymmetric accords always have the larger trade effect and this is 
always positive. Finally, the services trade effect is accentuated to 59.7% once anticipation 
effects of services accords are included in the analysis. Our results also suggest that the 
maximum impact of a services accord is felt the farthest in time from actual accession; thus 
services agreements seem to have a significant “announcement effect.” 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we look at the determinants of 
services trade by sector and mode of delivery based on their classification in the GATS to 
arrive at the common set of factors that may have a bearing on bilateral services trade. Section 
3 introduces the empirical model used while Section 4 looks at the dummy variables used in the 
analysis to capture the trade effects of different types and forms of PTAs. Section 5 describes 
the data and conducts a preliminary examination of it while Section 6 discusses estimation 
choices. The next two sections discuss the basic results from the empirical model as well as the 
results disaggregated by type of agreement and nature of relationship. Section 9 concludes.  
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2. Determinants of bilateral services trade 
 
We consider the set of major services sub-sectors (listed in the Central Products Classification 
of the GATS) for trade between any two possible trading partners and for each of them, suggest 
possible modes of services delivery3 and the most important likely determinants of such trade, 
based on our intuitive understanding of the latter. This is reported in Table 1. The purpose of 
this exercise is to distil the common set of factors that may affect trade in services between 
partners and to use them as explanatory variables in a gravity model for bilateral services trade. 
Thus, if we look at Table 1 for computer and related services, we see that these are delivered 
cross-border, through commercial presence and the movement of professionals (Modes 1, 3 and 
4, respectively) and the likely determinants of such trade between partners include 
infrastructure and human capital resources as well as the presence of a common business 
language and an open policy regime. 
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Replicating this analysis for the other sub-sectors listed in Table 1, we find that the common set 
of factors that emerges as important determinants of bilateral services trade is market size 
(economic), trade in goods, the presence of a common business language (where we consider 
English), quality infrastructure, open policy regime (i.e. few restrictions on the various modes 
of services delivery), low cost human capital and common laws/legal systems. These are the 
variables that we use in a gravity model as determinants of bilateral services trade. We also use 
geographical distance to proxy the costs involved in transportation between countries. Finally 
to estimate the trade effect of a services agreement, we include a PTA dummy that takes the 
value 1 for countries that are members of a PTA that has an element of services liberalization in 
it. 
 
                                                 
3 The WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) classifies four “modes” of services delivery (these 
are the different ways in which services can be traded across borders): Mode One, which is the cross-border 
supply of services. An illustration of this is business process outsourcing units in India doing online medical 
transcriptions. Mode Two is consumption of services abroad for e.g. Indian tourists going to the EU. Mode Three 
is commercial presence, such as Deutsche Bank setting up operations in Mumbai. Finally, Mode Four is the 
movement of natural persons across borders to deliver services. An illustration of this is Indian software 
professionals working on-site on IT projects in the UK. 
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3. The empirical model 
 
Using the determinants identified above, we estimate our model in a log-linerarized form, 
setting bilateral services trade data in a panel for 25 exporting and 53 importing countries for 
five years over 1999-2003, available from the OECD’s database.  The baseline specification is 
as follows: 
 
svsxijt = αij + β1gdpit + β2gdpjt + β3pcgdpit + β4pcgdpjt + β5distij + β6gdsxijt + β7ENGij + 
β8teledenit + β9teledenjt + β10resti + β11restj+ β12hkit+ β13hkjt + β14LAWij + β15PTA_SVSijt + 
εijt…………....................................................................................................................………(1) 
 
All variables in lower case are in log levels; the sub-script ‘i’ refers to the exporter, ‘j’ to the 
importer,‘t’ is the sub-script on variables that vary over time. All continuous variables are in 
log form with the exception of the dummy variables. The variables, their description and data 
sources are reported in Table 2. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
A priori, we expect the estimates of β1 through β4, β6 through β9, and β12 through β15 to be 
positive and those of β5, β10 and β11 to be negative.  
 
4. More about the PTA dummies 
 
The crucial explanatory variable in our model is the dummy on participation in PTAs involving 
elements of services liberalization. We refer to WTO-notified PTAs for country-specific 
information in this regard. The estimated coefficient on the PTA_SVS dummy provides the 
direction and magnitude of the impact of a services agreement on the bilateral services trade 
between the trading partners in our sample4.  
  
                                                 
4 A lacuna in this analysis, however, is the homogeneity of the PTA_SVS dummy i.e. the use of the same dummy 
for all trading pairs in our sample. Ideally, the PTA dummies should be calibrated according to the extent of 
liberalization achieved/expected to be attained in each of the agreements, which would then yield more precise 
estimates of the trade effects. 
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At the outset it is important to note that for the period of our analysis (1999-2003), 22.3% of 
the observations in our sample have a services accord (PTA_SVS), while 27.8% of them have a 
goods agreement (PTA_GDS). All trading partners that have a services agreement also have a 
goods agreement. Thus, the impact of a services accord also carries with it the impact of goods 
agreements and in that, the two cannot be separated from each other. This also implies 
however, that about 5.5% of our observations have a “goods only” agreement (GOPTA) and we 
can thus study the independent and joint impacts of having a “goods only” agreement and the 
“pseudo-incremental” impact of having a services agreement. 
 
We also classify agreements (both services and any) as North-North (NN), South-South (SS) 
and North-South (NS) depending on the economic status of the partner countries5. Following 
Gasiorek et al (2007), we also break down NS accords into symmetric and asymmetric 
depending on the extent of reciprocity of commitments and their implementation between the 
partner countries6. We also found our sample of symmetric pairings to include former Central 
and Eastern European Countries7 (CEEC) that were signing and implementing Association 
Agreements with the EU. It is therefore possible that services trade flows towards the CEEC 
may have also been influenced by other factors such as the likelihood of future accession to the 
EU. Our analysis, therefore, also includes a division of the North-South symmetric dummy into 
two parts, one, which looks at flows from the North to the South countries such as Israel and 
South Africa and two, which covers flows from the EU to CEEC to control for the impact of 
trade agreements between the EU and CEEC, especially if, as expected, trade flows to the latter 
have been affected more by non-trade-related reasons.  
 
We thus have: 
• the South-South PTA dummy that takes value one if the two countries are both 
developing and in the same preferential agreement, zero otherwise;  
                                                 
5 We follow the WTO definitions here. Thus, while Mexico is an OECD country, we classify it as a South country.  
All EU-15 Members are classified as “North” countries, while the new EU Members are classified as “South” 
countries as they had not acceded to the EU for the sample period (1999-2003) in our analysis. 
6 USA-Singapore would be an example of a symmetric NS PTA while USA-Chile would be an example of an 
asymmetric NS PTA. 
7 These included Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland in our sample, all of which have 
now acceded to the EU.  
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• the symmetric North-South PTA dummy that takes value one if one country partner is 
developed, the other is developing and  both countries are in the same agreement characterised 
by a perfectly reciprocal implementation, zero otherwise; 
• the EUCEEC dummy that takes value one if one partner country is from EU-15 and the 
other is one of the CEEC;  
• the asymmetric North-South PTA dummy that takes value one if one country partner is 
developed, the other is developing and  both countries are in the same agreement characterised 
by a less than reciprocal implementation, zero otherwise; 
• the North-North PTA dummy that takes value one if the two countries are both 
developed and in the same preferential agreement, zero otherwise.  
 
Since our data covers the period 1999-2003, if an agreement was reached before 1999, the 
associated dummy variable takes a value 1 over 1999-2003. On the other hand, if the agreement 
came into effect after 1999, then the dummy takes a value 1 in the year of accession and every 
year after that and a value 0 otherwise8.  
 
5. Data description and preliminary analysis  
       
There are more than 6600 observations on the variables in our model for the 25 exporting and 
53 importing countries in our sample (the list of these countries is included in Annex Table 
A1). Preliminary diagnosis of the data revealed that four trading partners had reported negative 
services exports9. These observations were excluded from the sample. In addition, data on 
services exports was found missing for over 2000 observations over 1999-2003, which 
effectively reduces the sample size by that number. Table 3 shows the mean value for our 
sample variables, along with the minimum, maximum and the standard deviation. Wherever 
required, the nominal values have been converted to real terms, using the US GDP implicit 
price deflator.  
                                                 
8 This treatment also renders our PTA dummies time-variant, which, from the perspective of empirical analysis, 
means that they can be retrieved in fixed-effects specifications. 
9 These were: France-Norway, France-Philippines, Ireland-Brazil & Czech Republic-Colombia. 
 8
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
Figure 1 shows trading partner pairs in our sample which had bilateral services exports in 
excess of USD 10 bn over 1999-2003. Looking at these cross-section averages over 1999-2003, 
we find that 17 trading pairs (1.7% of the entire sample) had bilateral services exports in excess 
of USD 10 bn and interestingly, half of these had a services agreement with each other.  
 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
The data has also been tabulated by percentile distribution of bilateral services exports 
averaged over 1999-2003 and the existence of PTAs (see Table 4). About 17% of all trading 
pairs in the sample had a value exceeding USD 1 bn (and more than half of these had a services 
accord with each other), which points towards a highly skewed distribution (bilateral services 
exports of the 90th percentile is 526 times that of the 10th percentile in Table 4). Also, as 
expected, both larger bilateral goods and services exports are associated with a PTA or a 
services PTA between trading partners. Bilateral services exports are 2.3 (2.0) times higher and 
bilateral goods exports 3.7 (3.1) times higher in the presence of a services (any) PTA than 
otherwise (see Table 4)10.  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Bivariate relationships between bilateral services exports and each of the independent variables 
are evident from Table 5 on cross-correlation (column 2) and suggest that these relationships 
validate the empirical model that we use. Table 5 also shows that the data suffers from 
multicollinearity; per capita income in particular was found to be strongly correlated with 
human capital, teledensity and the restrictiveness measures (correlation coefficient exceeding 
absolute 0.45 in each case). We addressed this problem by using the difference in the levels of 
PCGDP as an explanatory variable instead of the log levels, which also served to test Linder’s 
Hypothesis, which states that countries at similar levels of PCY trade more intensively with 
each other. The correlation between goods exports and GDP is addressed in the appendix A1 to 
                                                 
10 These magnitudes do not account for factors other than the existence of a trade agreement that have a bearing on 
bilateral services trade and are therefore larger than the trade effects from our multivariate analysis in the 
following section.   
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this paper as it discusses the treatment of bilateral goods trade as an explanatory variable in our 
model. The other variables found to be correlated included GDP and human capital of the 
exporting country; teledensity and restrictiveness in the exporting country; teledensity and 
human capital in the importing country; goods and services PTA dummies; and PTA dummies 
and distance. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
The first set of regressions was carried out using OLS on the complete model with all the 
explanatory variables. It was found that GDPkt, PCGDPkt, GDSXijt, TELEDENit, RESTj, DISTij 
and the dummies for ENGij, RTAij and PTA_SVS were all statistically significant and of the 
“right” sign. The coefficient on HKkt was negative and statistically significant, which was due 
to its correlation with GDPkt. We addressed this problem by regressing GDPkt on HKkt in 
separate estimations for the exporting and importing countries and using the residuals from 
these equations in lieu of HKkt. The counter-intuitive estimates of TELEDENjt and RESTi were 
due to multicollinearity as well; this was addressed by excluding these variables one by one 
from the complete model. The coefficient for LAWijt, however, was found to be negative and 
statistically significant throughout specifications, which was a perverse result, which we could 
not account for. It was thus decided to leave this variable out of the estimation. 
 
The final baseline specification was as follows: 
 
svsxijt = αij + β1gdpit + β2gdpjt + β3DPCGDP11ijt + β4distij + β5gdsxijt + β6ENGij + β7teledenit 
+ β8teledenjt + β9resti + β10restj+ β11hkit+ β12hkjt + β13PTA_SVSijt + 
εijt………………………...............................................................................................……….(2) 
 
Initial empirical diagnosis also showed Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic to be outliers 
amongst our services exporters and Iceland, Nigeria & Pakistan to be outliers amongst our list 
of importers. We found that the outliers biased the estimates of the coefficients on some of our 
explanatory variables (such as goods exports, exporter GDP, importer human capital, importer 
                                                 
11 Since the difference in PCY can be negative, if we used the log of this difference, we would lose observations; 
hence, we use the level of the difference. Statistically, we can still derive the elasticity by multiplying the mean of 
the difference in PCY by the coefficient on this variable.  
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teledensity, common language and services PTA12) upwards and others (such as importer GDP, 
restrictiveness and distance13) downwards.  However, in view of the fact that the magnitude of 
the bias on the variable of our interest, the estimated trade effect, was only 1.2 percentage 
points14, while the exclusion of the outliers from the sample decreased the potential size of the 
sample by 19%, we decided to continue with the entire sample in our empirical investigations.  
 
6. Choice of estimation technique  
 
The choice of the empirical strategy is governed by the underlying theory, data and its 
characteristics, recent developments in estimation methodology and any other objective(s) that 
the researcher may have. In our case, the main econometric problems were to correct for biases 
emanating from (i) the unobserved heterogeneity characterizing trading partner samples; (ii) the 
incidence of “export zeroes15”; and (iii) treating the PTA explanatory variable(s) as exogenous. 
Given that less than 5% of our dependent variable observations reported “zero” exports, we 
focussed on addressing problems (i) and (iii) by using the bilateral fixed-effects model (FEM) 
with country-and-time effects as suggested by Baier & Bergstrand (2007). In this section, we 
provide more details on the methodological issues that governed the final choice of estimation 
technique for our empirical model and also discuss robustness checks based on recent 
developments in the gravity model estimation literature. 
 
The earliest applications of the gravity equation to international trade flows were not grounded 
in formal theory. It was only with Anderson (1979) that formal theoretical economic 
foundations to the gravity model surfaced. One of the salient features of the latter has been the 
inclusion of multilateral price measures in estimating the gravity model, which ipso facto takes 
care of the omitted variable bias that existed in the earlier models owing to the absence of such 
                                                 
12 Evenett (2002) came up with an identical direction of the bias in his analysis of the estimated trade effect (but 
an opposite direction in the case of distance). “My econometric findings suggest that the presence of outliers tends 
to substantially increase the absolute value of the estimated distance parameter and the estimated dummy 
variable.” (Evenett, 2002, op.cit.,pp 558) 
13 i.e the absolute values of the estimated restrictiveness and distance parameters increased in the absence of 
outliers. 
14 The estimated coefficient went up from 0.11 to 0.12. 
15 For instance see Helpman et. al. (2008), Baldwin & Harrigan (2008) and Ben Shepherd (2008). 
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variables16. Following Anderson & van Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004) this has been 
achieved in the literature by including country-specific effects in the model, which is a 
computationally easier route for the inclusion of multilateral price measures. Cheng & Wall 
(2004) further showed that the best estimates came from estimating a pair-wise bilateral fixed 
effects model (FEM), while Baier & Bergstrand (2007) have recently added country-and-time 
effects to the pair-wise bilateral FEM, wherein the former account explicitly for the time-
varying multilateral price terms in a panel setting.  
 
The other recent change in gravity model estimation has been scaling the dependent variable by 
the product of the real GDPs of the trading partners (i.e. svsx/gdpi.gdpj), which amounts to 
imposing unitary income elastic restrictions on the gravity model. While Baier & Bergstrand 
(2007) found this to have no impact on the coefficient of the PTA dummy if the model was 
estimated with country-and-time effects, in our case, the services trade effect actually became 
negative (-5.3%). We further found that the explanatory power was significantly reduced in this 
specification17. For both these reasons, we did not impose any unitary income elastic 
restrictions on our empirical specification. 
 
Finally, in a significant departure from earlier work, researchers (Magee, 2003; Baier & 
Bergstrand, 2002, 2004, 2007; Egger et.al. 2008) have begun to treat the PTA dummy as an 
endogenous (as opposed to hitherto exogenous) independent variable. While we document the 
results from both approaches in this paper, our results focus on the treatment of the PTA 
dummy as an endogenous variable in line with Baier & Bergstrand (2007). 
 
We began our estimation of the gravity model with the PTA dummy as an exogenous variable 
and in that, report results from four different techniques by way of comparison: ordinary least 
squares (OLS), pair-wise fixed-effects (FEM), Hausman-Taylor (HTM) & Poisson Pseudo-
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) [see Table 6].  
                                                 
16 It is now fairly well established in gravity model literature that a simple OLS estimation tends to bias the results 
as there are likely to be effects common to the trading countries that are not included in the estimation (Cheng & 
Wall, 2004). In other words, heterogeneity is not allowed for. These effects could be due to “historical, cultural, 
ethnic, political, or geographic factors that affect the level of trade and correlated with the gravity variables (GDP, 
population, distance).” (Cheng & Wall, op.cit. pp 54) 
17 The within-R-squared was reduced to 0.3 from 0.5. 
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 Both FEM and HTM, as opposed to OLS, account for the heterogeneity in the data stemming 
from the unobservables common to the trading partner pairs and in that are superior to OLS, 
which ipso facto suffers from an omitted variable bias. The HTM also has the added advantage 
of retrieving the coefficients of time-invariant variables like distance and common language in 
the results, which is not possible using FEM, which also consumes too many degrees of 
freedom. Moreover, unlike FEM, HTM also empirically enables the treatment of the FTA 
dummy as an endogenous (as opposed to exogenous) variable in estimating the trade effect of 
an accord18. While Egger (2002, 2005) and Carrere (2006, pp 231-232) advocate the use of 
HTM over FEM in cross-section and panel settings, respectively, Egger (2000) and Baier & 
Bergstrand (2007) advocate the use of the FEM over random effects (REM) in a panel setting 
for both theoretical and empirical reasons and the HTM is a REM. In fact, the use of the 
Hausman specification test provided conclusive evidence for estimating our empirical model 
using fixed as opposed to random effects.  
 
PPML, on the other hand, neither accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity in the data nor 
enables endogenous treatment of the PTA dummy. Rather, it advocates the use of a simple 
Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood because in the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data, 
the standard log-linearized gravity model yields inconsistent estimates19 (Silva & Tenreyro, 
2006; Siliverstovs & Schumacher, 2007). “An additional problem of log-linearization is that it 
is incompatible with the existence of zeroes in trade data, which led to several unsatisfactory 
solutions, including truncation of the sample and further non-linear transformations of the 
dependent variable.” (Silva & Tenreyro, op.cit., pp 653)  The PPML, therefore, corrects for all 
these problems. However, these problems were found not to be as important for our data as the 
biases emanating from unobserved heterogeneity and the exogenous treatment of the PTA 
                                                 
18 Using the Hausman over-identification test, we identified some of our independent variables as endogenous 
(these included GDP, human capital, teledensity, and the PTA dummies) and others as exogenous (distance, 
common language and restrictiveness variables in our specification) and used the mean of the exogenous 
independent variables as instruments for the time-variant or endogenous independent variables correlated with 
(specific) bilateral effects to account for the unobservables, a la Hausman & Taylor (1981).  
19 “This is because the expected value of the logarithm of a random variable depends on higher-order moments of 
its distribution. Therefore, if the errors are heteroskedastic, the transformed errors will be generally correlated with 
the covariates.” (Silva & Tenreyro, op.cit., pp 653)  
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dummy, for which reason, the bilateral FEM with country-and-time effects was our preferred 
estimation. 
 
The recent acknowledgement of endogeneity of the PTA dummy in the empirical trade 
literature is based on the intuition that if there is a tendency for countries to “self-select20” 
themselves into an accord, then treating the PTA dummy as exogenous would under-estimate 
the magnitude of the trade effect21. The treatment of endogeneity in cross-section data has been 
done through the use of instrumental variables and Heckman control functions (Magee, 2003; 
Baier & Bergstrand, 2002, 2004, 2007) but this has been said to be unsatisfactory (for e.g. see 
Baier & Bergstrand, 2007) largely on account of the choice of instruments and the instruments 
not being exogenous of the error term. On the other hand, Baier & Bergstrand (2007a, 2007b) 
have claimed that the use of a bilateral pair-wise FEM with country-and-time effects or 
alternatively, the use of OLS in a difference-in-difference model, both using panel data, lead to 
a more satisfactory treatment of the endogeneity problem. A la Baier & Bergstrand (2002, 
2007), we thus also estimated a bilateral pair-wise FEM with country-and-time effects as well 
as a difference-in-difference (DID) model to endogenize the effects of the PTA dummy in our 
panel. The latter resulted in an even larger and more statistically significant services trade 
effect of 20.9%. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt in the literature on 
gravity model estimation of bilateral services trade to endogenize the trade effect.           
 
Other recent changes in gravity model estimation have involved decomposing the total trade 
effect of a PTA into the Vinerian effects of trade creation and trade diversion (e.g. see Frankel, 
1997; Soloaga & Winters, 2001; Silva & Tenreyro, 2006; Carrere, 2007). This essentially 
involves introducing a new dummy variable in the equation (say OPENNESS) that takes the 
value 1 when any or both trading partners have a trade agreement with the rest of the world 
(ROW). The net trade creation effect of a PTA is then the difference between the estimated 
coefficients on the PTA and the OPENNESS dummies22. In our sample, all trading partners 
                                                 
20 i.e. countries that enter into an agreement are already those that trade significantly with each other and vice 
versa. 
21 For instance, Baier & Bergstrand (2007) find the trade effect from goods agreements to quintuple once the PTA 
variable’s endogeneity is accounted for econometrically.    
22 Logically, the functioning of these dummies is relative to none of the countries in the sample having any 
agreement with ROW.  
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have some form of an agreement with ROW such that the OPENNESS variable takes the value 
1 throughout and hence, is dropped out of our estimation due to collinearity. We therefore 
estimate our model without this dummy. Our PTA dummies therefore denote the gross, as 
opposed to the net, trade creation effect of an agreement. 
 
7. Estimation results 
 
For purposes of comparison, we provide the results from using different estimation techniques 
in Table 6. However, for the reasons outlined in the preceding section, we focus on the results 
from Baier & Bergstrand (B&B, 2007), both for this section and for the remainder of the 
analysis in this paper. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
The estimation results validate the choice of determinants in our empirical model. Since our 
preferred B&B (2007) estimation involves using bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects, 
the coefficients of the time-invariant pairwise and time-varying country-specific explanatory 
variables cannot be retrieved. So we focus on the results for the remaining explanatory 
variables.    
 
Goods exports have an estimated coefficient of 0.17, thereby suggesting that a 10% rise in 
bilateral goods exports would, ceteris paribus and on average, lead to a 1.7% rise in bilateral 
services exports in this model. 
 
The coefficient on the difference in PCGDP between the exporting and importing countries was 
found to be negative, which therefore confirmed Linder’s hypothesis, but this result was 
statistically insignificant. 
 
Our restrictiveness measures of services trade show huge symmetric negative effects on 
bilateral services export with elasticities of -19.9 and -261 for the exporter and importer, 
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respectively. The much larger magnitude of these estimates using B&B (2007) compared to 
other estimation methods in Table 6 reflects their endogenous treatment. 
 
Finally, the PTA_SVS dummy had a positive and significant coefficient of 0.14, which 
translates into a trade effect of 1523%, ceteris paribus and on average. 
 
Baier & Bergstrand (2007) have accounted for the phasing-in of PTAs by introducing the 
lagged effects of PTA on trade. Given that every PTA has a phase-in period, typically over 10 
years24, the entire treatment effect on trade cannot be captured in the concurrent year. They 
therefore use one or two lagged levels of the PTA dummy in their estimation (PTAij,t-1 and 
PTAij,t-2), which accentuates the average treatment effect (ATE). Since they use a panel of 
cross-section time series data at five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000, they thus include ten 
years preceding accession to study the lagged effects of PTA on trade.  
 
Since our data ranges from 1999 to 2003, we could only include up to five years preceding 
accession but like Baier & Bergstrand (2007), we too found the ATE to be accentuated to 
59.7% by including such anticipation effects. The trade effects in the three years preceding 
accession were negative (and statistically significant only in the second year) but significantly 
positive in the fourth and fifth year preceding accession (15% and 55.3%, respectively). 
However, the services trade effect in the actual year of accession reduced to 13.9% if we 
included such anticipation effects and also became statistically insignificant. This suggested 
that the maximum impact of a services accord was felt the farthest in time from actual 
accession and that services agreements seem to have a significant “announcement effect.” 
 
8. Disaggregating the impact of preferential trade agreements  
 
In what follows, we use the B&B (2007) estimation to study the impact of PTAs in detail 
breaking these down by the economic status of the trading partners and by the reciprocity (or 
the lack thereof) of commitments. The trade effect by type of PTA in each case is shown in 
                                                 
23 Calculated as [exp(0.14)-1]*100 
24 For instance, both the original EEC agreement of 1958 and the NAFTA had a 10-year phase-in provision. 
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Table 7. The empirical estimates of the other variables in the estimation have not been shown 
in this table as our focus is on detailing the impact of PTAs as opposed to discussing the entire 
estimation output.    
<Insert Table 7 here> 
 
Looking at services agreements (Column I-II, Table 7), we found the trade effect of 
NN_PTA_SVS to be both statistically and economically significant (16.2% increase in bilateral 
services exports) while that of NS_PTA_SVS to be statistically insignificant (but with a trade 
effect of 5.3%). We found the result for NS_PTA_SVS to be driven by asymmetric agreements 
(statistically insignificant but with a trade effect of 5.3%). SS_PTA_SVS and symmetric 
NS_PTA_SVS dummies dropped out of the estimation. 
 
Replicating the analysis for “any agreement” (Column III-IV, Table 7), we found the trade 
effect of NN_PTA_ANY to be both economically and statistically significant as well (20.9% 
increase in bilateral services exports) while that of NS_PTA_ANY to be statistically 
insignificant (but with a trade effect of 4.1%). SS_PTA_ANY dropped out of the estimation. A 
la services accords, the result for NS_PTA_ANY was largely due to asymmetric agreements 
(statistically insignificant but with a trade effect of 13.1%). Symmetric NS_PTA_ANY, on the 
other hand, reported a statistically insignificant trade effect of -6.1%. 
  
Finally, looking at “goods only” agreements (Column V-VI, Table 7), we found NN accords 
to have the largest services trade effect (105.4% increase in bilateral services exports). The 
result for NS_GOPTA, however, lacked statistical significance and was also small in 
magnitude (trade effect of 1.8%) but was again driven by asymmetric agreements (statistically 
insignificant but with a trade effect of 6.9%). Symmetric NS_GOPTA reported a statistically 
insignificant trade effect of -5.6%. SS_GOPTA again dropped out of the estimation25.  
 
Table 8 summarizes these results. 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
                                                 
25 There are no South-South agreements in our sample of countries over 1999-2003 which is why the associated 
PTAs drop out of all these estimations. 
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 Thus, only North-North agreements (services or any) report both a positive and statistically 
significant trade effect between partners, which points to the predominance of increasing 
returns to scale (IRS) and intra-industry services trade in our sample. Empirically, this 
emanates from the fact that our data is dominated26 by North-North accords and there are 
comparatively fewer observations in our sample on North-South agreements and none at all on 
South-South accords, which therefore drop out of the estimation.  
 
The lack of statistical significance in the other results suggests that these should be interpreted 
with caution. However, as Schafer (1993) points out “the event of nonsignificance suggests 
only that the data are not sufficient to estimate a parameter. This does not mean the data 
estimate the parameter to be zero!27” In further defence, our point estimates are not small in 
magnitude and there is no a priori reason for assuming the trade effect to be zero; therefore in 
the absence of a Bayesian prior, the estimated coefficient is thus perhaps our best measure of 
the trade effect.  
 
Schafer (1993) also recommends that “nonsignificant results be accompanied by an evaluation 
of statistical power28”wherein his decision rule rules out results with too low or too high a 
statistical power29. Our evaluation of statistical power revealed that only three of the ten 
estimates that reported statistical nonsignificance in Table 8 had a statistical power30 that was 
neither too low, nor too high and these have been highlighted in red in that table31.      
 
These are the results that we focus on while comparing the magnitudes of the statistically 
insignificant trade effects and find that North-South services agreements also report positive 
trade effects. This finding suggests that services trade between countries in our sample may be 
                                                 
26 21% of all observations in our sample are N-N, while only 6% are N-S and there are no observations on S-S 
accords during the period covering our analysis.  
27 Schafer (1993), op. cit. pp 384-385. 
28 Schafer (1993), op. cit. pp 386-387. 
29 “Should it turn out that the power of the study was low against even a reasonably large effect size, then we are 
forced to the conclusion that nothing much has been learned. On the other hand, when the power is large, then we 
can infer that if an effect exists it seems too small to be of much value.” Schafer (1993), op. cit. pp 386. 
30 This ranged from 0.37 to 0.58 at the 5 and 10% levels of significance. 
31 The statistical power was less than 0.2 in all other cases. 
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driven by differences in factor endowments as well and in that, such trade may be inter- 
industry. Further, within North-South agreements and irrespective of the form the agreement 
takes, asymmetric accords always have the larger trade effect and this is always positive. These 
findings thus suggest greater alliance between the North and the South in a bid to boost 
bilateral services trade and more importantly, suggest that this relationship can be less than 
perfectly reciprocal to be net trade-creating. Such agreements could thus attempt to capitalize 
on cost differences between trading partners based on differences in factor endowments and 
regulatory requirements and generate more inter-industry trade. Finally, North-North “goods 
only” agreements report the largest positive trade effect on bilateral services exports, 
confirming complementarities between provisions in such agreements and bilateral services 
trade. And this is what we discuss next.     
 
Table 9 summarises the trade effects from multivariate analyses conducted to study the 
sequential impacts of services and “goods only” agreements for different trading partner 
samples using the B&B (2007) estimation. As this table shows, services accords by themselves 
report a positive and statistically significant trade effect (except for the non-EU trading partners 
in our sample). “Goods only” agreements do not report a statistically significant32 (services) 
trade effect in our sample of countries33 but they do report a positive (services) trade effect. 
However, when such accords are paired with services agreements in non-EU countries or in the 
entire sample, the (services) trade effect of each set of agreements is enhanced, thereby 
confirming complementarities between the two. The magnitude of the incremental (services) 
trade effect was found to be 7.6% with the trade effect of services agreements going up by 
2.4% and that of “goods only” accords rising by 5.2%, ceteris paribus and on average. This 
also suggests that trading partners would benefit more from negotiating goods and services 
agreements in tandem, as opposed to sequentially. 
 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
 
                                                 
32 None of the results in Table 9 that show statistical nonsignificance passed Schafer’s (1993) decision rule in an 
evaluation of statistical power. They should thus be interpreted with caution.   
33 Once again, this may be the result of the sample size as “goods only” accords comprise only 5% of all 
observations in our sample. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
The empirical literature on gravity model estimation of bilateral services trade exhibits neither 
consensus nor conformity to economic theory in estimating the impact of the determinants of 
such trade. The role of bilateral goods trade in determining bilateral services trade has not been 
explored in detail as well; neither has the separate impact of “goods only” and services accords 
on bilateral services trade ever been studied. Methodologically, only recent empirical work 
accounts for the influence of heterogeneity in trading country pairs in determining bilateral 
services trade, but even this fails to recognize the endogeneity of agreements in model 
estimation.    
 
This paper is an improvement on all these fronts. Our analysis explicitly accounts for the 
existence of alternative modes of supply and their relationships, which is needed not just for 
better understanding of the determinants and pattern of services trade, but also the effects of 
policies as can be seen from the results of our analyses.  
 
A caveat in the analysis undertaken here is the homogeneity of the PTA dummies, the 
calibration of which does not take into account the varying extents of liberalization in different 
agreements. This could therefore be an agenda for further research in this area. The paper also 
does not look into the political economy of bilateral services trade as well as issues of 
regulatory harmonization, both of which can be candidates for further research and analysis. 
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 Figure 1: Top services export flows (real USD bn, 1999-2003)  
Top services export flows
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Table 1: Determinants of services trade by sector and mode of delivery 
 
 
Sector Mode of Delivery Determinants of Trade 
Computer & related 
services 
1,3,4 Infrastructure, human capital, English 
language, open policy regime 
Telecom 3 Market, infrastructure, open policy regime 
Insurance 1,3 Infrastructure, English language, open policy 
regime, market size 
Banking 1,3 Infrastructure, English language, open policy 
regime, market size 
Construction 3,4 Infrastructure, open policy regime, trade in 
goods 
Distribution 3 Market size, open policy regime, trade in goods 
Health 1,2,3,4 Infrastructure, human capital, open policy 
regime 
Architectural services 1,3,4 Infrastructure, human capital, open policy 
regime 
Legal services 1,3,4 Infrastructure, human capital, open policy 
regime, common legal system 
Accountancy services 1,3,4 Infrastructure, human capital, open policy 
regime, common laws 
Hotels, restaurant and 
tourism services 
2,3 Market size, cultural ties/hospitality, English 
language, infrastructure,  
Transport services 3 Market size, infrastructure, open policy regime, 
trade in goods 
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Table 2: List of variables, their description and data source
 
Variable 
Name 
Description Data Source 
SVSXijt  Services exports from country i (reporter) to 
country j (partner) 
OECD bilateral trade in services database 
GDPkt  GDP of country k  
(k = i,j) 
World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
PCGDPkt  Per capita income of country k  
(k = i,j) 
World Bank’s WDI 
DISTij  Geographical distance between the two countries’ 
economic centres (capital cities for simplicity) 
Vulcansoft  
(http://www.vulconsoft.com/html97)  
Indocom  
(http://www.indocom.com/distance) 
GDSXijt  Goods exports from country i (reporter) to country 
j (partner) 
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
ENGij  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
English is the official language in the trading 
partners 
CIA’s Factbook about languages in the 
countries of the world  
RESTk Extent of restrictiveness to services trade in 
country k (k = i,j) measured by trade 
restrictiveness indices 
Developed by Australian Productivity 
Commission; compiled by Dee (2005). 
Annex Table A2 shows the countries, 
sectors and years for which this information 
is available. RESTk is an unweighted 
average of the restrictiveness indices for 
each of these services sub-sectors. 
TELEDENkt  Index of telecom density measured by fixed line 
and mobile phone subscribers (per 1000 people) 
[proxy for infrastructure development in country k 
(k = i,j)] 
World Bank WDI 
HKkt  Measure of human capital in country k (k = i,j) 
proxied by gross tertiary school enrolment34 (%) 
World Bank WDI 
LAWij  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
trading partners have a common legal system 
CIA’s Factbook about legal systems in the 
countries of the world  
PTA_SVSijt  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
trading partners are a member of the same 
services accord 
WTO’s Committee on Regional Trade 
Agreements 
                                                 
34 Even though enrolment is an investment variable as opposed to a stock variable, it is still a stock measure (even 
if imperfect) of the flow in steady state. 
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 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
svsx (real USD bn) 4327 1.0 3.1 0.0 38.0
gdsx (real USD bn) 6363 3.1 11.6 0.0 250.0
gdpi (real USD bn) 6603 1040.0 2130.0 19.5 11700.0
gdpj (real USD bn) 6603 604.0 1530.0 7.8 11700.0
popi (mn) 6603 37.0 59.0 0.4 291.0
popj (mn) 6603 90.5 219.0 0.3 1290.0
pcgdpi (USD, cur intl PPP) 5544 26397.8 9218.4 10800.0 65349.0
pcgdpj (USD, cur intl PPP) 6603 16805.2 10384.9 795.0 37501.0
hki 6180 55.2 17.2 9.0 87.0
hkj 5781 44.7 20.0 3.0 87.0
teledeni 6603 1194.2 262.5 430.0 1998.0
teledenj 6603 796.8 491.3 4.0 1750.0
engij (dummy for common language) 6603 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0
lawij (dummy for common legal system) 6603 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.0
asymns_pta_any 6603 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
symns_pta_any 6603 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
euceec_pta_any 6603 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00
resti 6603 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.5
restj 6228 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.7
distij 6478 6196.3 4755.8 66.0 19845.0
Documents for import (year 2005) 6603 8.2 3.4 3.0 16.0
Time for import (year 2005) 6603 22.0 12.3 3.0 53.0
Cost of import (year 2005) 6603 999.7 448.0 333.0 2260.0
Simple avg. appd. Tariff 6353 8.6 1.3 2.0 9.6
Import-wted. appd. Tariff 6353 7.8 1.1 2.4 8.6
Simple avg. MFN tariff 6353 10.4 1.2 5.3 11.9
Import-wted. MFN tariff 6353 9.6 1.0 4.6 10.5
PTA_GDS (dummy for goods PTAs) 6603 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
PTA_SVS (dummy for services PTAs) 6603 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
PTA_ANY (dummy for any PTA) 6603 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
GOPTA (dummy for "goods only" PTAs) 6603 0.05 0.23 0.00 1.00
nngopta 6603 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
ssgopta 6603 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
nsgopta 6603 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00
asymnsgopta 6603 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00
symnsgopta 6603 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00
euceecgopta 6603 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
nn_pta_svs 6603 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
ss_pta_svs 6603 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ns_pta_svs 6603 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
asymns_pta_svs 6603 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00
symns_pta_svs 6603 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
euceec_pta_svs 6603 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00
nn_pta_any 6603 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
ss_pta_any 6603 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ns_pta_any 6603 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
 
Table 3: Description of data for variables used in the model 
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Table 4: Averages by groups - Top services exporters and PTAs 
 
Percentiles SvsX (real USD mn) GdsX (real USD bn) GDPi (real USD bn) GDPj (real USD bn) PCGDPi PCGDPj POPi (mn) POPj (mn) HKi HKj TELEDENi TELEDENj RESTi RESTj DISTij (km)
P10 4.4                                  0.0                                  60.9                                47.2                                16'303.8     4'074.0       4.5                4.5                30.3    15.0    984.0          192.6          0.1       0.2       892                 
P20 15.0                                0.1                                  123.0                              74.0                                18'544.8     6'412.2       5.4                6.7                48.8    23.4    1'083.8        273.8          0.2       0.2       1'329              
P30 41.7                                0.2                                  136.0                              105.0                              26'034.4     8'929.4       8.1                10.2              50.6    30.3    1'102.2        360.8          0.2       0.2       2'019              
P40 70.6                                0.3                                  186.0                              129.0                              26'239.2     10'827.2     10.2              15.6              52.8    36.6    1'138.6        567.0          0.2       0.2       3'209              
P50 130.0                              0.5                                  257.0                              179.0                              26'549.8     17'329.0     10.3              31.1              58.2    48.8    1'182.8        985.4          0.2       0.2       5'702              
P60 230.0                              0.8                                  430.0                              216.0                              26'670.6     23'018.4     19.4              44.6              59.5    52.8    1'239.6        1'102.2        0.2       0.3       7'660              
P70 397.0                              1.4                                  693.0                              317.0                              27'816.4     26'157.8     40.9              62.0              60.6    54.8    1'281.2        1'160.2        0.2       0.3       8'833              
P80 719.0                              2.6                                  1'510.0                            533.0                              29'208.2     26'670.6     59.3              82.3              72.0    60.1    1'392.2        1'250.2        0.2       0.4       9'839              
P90 2'300.0                            6.0                                  2'130.0                            1'370.0                            29'563.6     29'393.2     82.3              146.0            75.2    70.8    1'445.0        1'392.2        0.4       0.5       12'110            
P90/P10 525.9                              222.8                              35.0                                29.0                                1.8              7.2              18.2              32.3              2.5      4.7      1.5              7.2              3.1       3.5       13.6                 
 
 
Agreements SvsX (real USD mn) GdsX (real USD bn) GDPi (real USD bn) GDPj (real USD bn) PCGDPi PCGDPj POPi (mn) POPj (mn) HKi HKj TELEDENi TELEDENj RESTi RESTj DISTij (km)
PTA_SVS=0 766.8 2.0 1152.0 616.1 25913.5 14607.9 40.3 109.0 54.9 41.1 1168.4 683.2 0.2 0.3 7491.7
PTA_SVS=1 1727.0 7.3 631.1 560.5 28475.5 24450.8 25.2 26.1 56.4 56.3 1284.2 1192.0 0.2 0.2 1759.6
(1/0) 2.3 3.7 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.2 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.2
PTA_ANY=0 768.7 2.0 1185.0 649.4 25664.2 14448.7 41.3 115.0 54.6 41.7 1157.2 666.1 0.2 0.3 7752.5
PTA_ANY=1 1522.0 6.1 649.2 485.0 28616.0 22918.9 25.7 27.0 56.6 51.7 1290.4 1136.0 0.2 0.2 2234.6
(1/0) 2.0 3.1 0.5 0.7 1.1 1.6 0.6 0.2 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.3  
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Table 5: Correlation between variables (panel 1999-2003)
 
(n = 3123) lsvsx lgdsx lgdpi lgdpj lpcgdpi lpcgdpj lteledeni lteledenj lhki lhkj engij lawij lresti lrestj pta_svs pta_gds ldist
lsvsx 1.00
lgdsx 0.85 1.00
lgdpi 0.55 0.58 1.00
lgdpj 0.49 0.47 0.03 1.00
lpcgdpi 0.30 0.18 0.28 -0.01 1.00
lpcgdpj 0.36 0.28 -0.06 0.25 -0.03 1.00
lteledeni 0.11 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.68 -0.04 1.00
lteledenj 0.26 0.22 -0.09 0.10 -0.02 0.91 0.04 1.00
lhki 0.22 0.29 0.47 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
lhkj 0.20 0.14 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.76 0.00 0.77 -0.01 1.00
engij 0.17 0.09 0.12 -0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 0.07 0.00 1.00
lawij 0.17 0.21 -0.03 0.07 0.00 0.18 -0.02 0.20 -0.05 0.06 0.14 1.00
lresti -0.22 -0.18 -0.28 0.03 -0.66 0.04 -0.58 0.05 -0.32 0.04 -0.19 0.00 1.00
lrestj -0.21 -0.12 0.00 -0.18 0.01 -0.46 0.05 -0.36 -0.01 -0.46 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
pta_svs 0.21 0.20 0.00 -0.09 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.37 0.11 0.31 -0.12 0.20 -0.14 -0.17 1.00
pta_gds 0.22 0.20 0.01 -0.13 0.17 0.32 0.22 0.38 0.14 0.21 -0.12 0.23 -0.18 -0.14 0.83 1.00
ldist -0.19 -0.27 0.18 0.21 0.11 -0.25 0.05 -0.32 0.06 -0.23 0.19 -0.28 -0.10 -0.06 -0.51 -0.51 1.00
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Table 6: Results from multivariate analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Bilateral services exports 
Variables/Estimation OLS OLS PPML PPML HTM FEM FEM B&B (2007) DID 
GDSXijt   0.4*** 0.396*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.17*** 0.075* 0.034 0.17*** 
GDPit   0.67*** 0.7*** 0.8*** 0.8*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.78***  
GDPjt   0.54** 0.5* 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.49*** 0.66* 1.3***  
HKit   0.34*** 0.31*** -0.12 -0.06 0.84*** 0.28*** 0.2***  
HKjt   0.33 0.37# -0.23** -0.26*** 0.089 0.18 -0.3  
TELEDENit  0.8*** 1.6*** 0.6*** 1.5*** 0.17 0.5*** 0.96***  
TELEDENjt  0.26*** 0.3*** 0.3*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.0 0.12#  
DPCGDPijt  -----------------------------------------------very small-------------------------------------------------- 
ENGij   1.3*** 1.3*** 0.6*** 0.64*** 0.87 
RESTi   -0.5*** -0.2* -0.58*** -0.37*** -1.7 -.24 0.03 -19.9   
RESTj   -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.56*** -0.55*** -1.4 -.42* -0.33# -261* 
SVS_PTAijt  0.126* 0.11* -0.44*** -0.45*** 0.11* -0.03 -0.044 0.14*               0.19*** 
DISTij   -0.76*** -0.76*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.68** 
Year2000    -0.26***  -0.26*** -0.003  -0.05 
Year2001    -0.4***  -0.36*** -0.094  -0.17*** 
Year2002    -0.5***  -0.4*** -0.16***  -0.26*** 
Year2003    -0.7***  -0.5*** -0.18**  -0.43*** 
Constant   -16.2** -21.5*** -25.6*** -32.5*** -16.4*** -19* -42.7*** -696*                   -0.09 
Observations  3123 3123 3296 3296 3123 3123 3123 3262          3069 
R-squared   0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 Within 0.3 0.3 0.5  0.09 
       Between 0.56 0.57 0.1 
       Overall 0.56 0.57 0.1 
 
 
Note: “OLS” is Ordinary Least Squares; “PPML” is Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood; “HTM” is Hausman-Taylor Method; “B&B” is 
Baier & Bergstrand (2007). Estimations based on PPML, B&B & HTM used log levels of HKi and HKj as independent variables; the other 
methods used their respective residuals from separate regressions on the log levels of GDPi and GDPj to account for multicollinearity.  
 
Levels of significance: #10%; *5%; **1%; ***0.1% 
 
 
Table 7: Trade effect by type of PTA 
 
Type of PTA/Trade effect (%)   I II III IV V VI  
 
NN_PTA_SVS     16.2* 16.2*  
NS_PTA_SVS     5.3  
ASYM_NS_PTA_SVS     5.3  
SYM_NS_PTA_SVS      
EUCEEC_PTA_SVS      
NN_PTA_ANY       20.9*** 20.9***  
NS_PTA_ ANY       4.1  
ASYM_NS_PTA_ ANY       13.1  
SYM_NS_PTA_ ANY       -6.1 
EUCEEC_PTA_ ANY        
NN_GOPTA         105.4** 105.4**  
NS_GOPTA         1.8  
ASYM_NS_GOPTA         6.9  
SYM_NS_GOPTA          -5.6 
EUCEEC_GOPTA          Huge
 
Significance levels: *5%, **1%, ***0.1% 
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Table 8: Summarizing impact of PTAs on bilateral services exports
 
Code Type of agreement Any PTA PTA_SVS "Goods Only" PTA 
I North-North 20.9%*** 16.2%* 105.4%** 
II South-South Dropped Dropped Dropped 
III North-South 4.1% (Insignificant) 
5.3% 
(Insignificant) 
1.8% 
(Insignificant) 
III. A Asymmetric North-South 13.1% (Insignificant) 
5.3% 
 (Insignificant) 
6.9% 
(Insignificant) 
III. B Symmetric North-South 
-6.1% 
(Insignificant) 
 
Dropped -5.6% (Insignificant) 
 
Significance levels: *5%, **1%, ***0.1% 
 
 
Table 9: Sequential and incremental impact of PTAs on bilateral services 
exports 
 
 PTA_SVS “Goods only” PTA  
Serial no. Trade effect Statistical significance Trade effect Statistical significance Sample coverage 
1 15.0% Yes*     All 
2   9.8% No All 
3 17.4% Yes* 15.0% No All 
4 32.3% Yes***   Intra-EU 
5   Dropped Dropped Intra-EU 
6 32.3% Yes*** Dropped Dropped Intra-EU 
7 -10.8% No   Non-EU 
8   13.9% No Non-EU 
9 -0.8% No 13.9% No Non-EU 
 
Significance levels: *5%, ***0.1% 
 
Appendix 
 
A1. Treatment of bilateral goods trade as an explanatory variable  
 
The inclusion of bilateral goods export (GDSXijt) in our estimation suffers from the obvious problem 
of endogeneity as there are several common factors that have an impact on both goods and services 
trade such as GDP for instance and hence, it is not easy to distinguish the impact of goods trade (on 
services trade) from that of these other factors.  
 
We thought of four different ways of tackling these problems: 
(1) Treat bilateral services and bilateral goods trade as a system of simultaneous equations where 
the bilateral trade variable in each case is the endogenous variable and the exogenous variables in the 
system are the other explanatory variables common to both as discussed above35.  
(2) Use instrumental variable (IV) estimation where instrumental variables such as tariffs, costs 
of importing, etc. could be used to instrument for bilateral goods trade in our model for bilateral 
services trade.    
                                                 
35 The only difference was to use applied weighted tariffs instead of RESTj in the determination of bilateral 
goods trade and replace PTA_SVS with PTA_GDS as the PTA dummy. 
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(3) Estimate bilateral goods trade using the explanatory variables in our model that are common 
determinants for services trade as well and to use the residual obtained from this as an additional 
explanatory variable in our bilateral services trade model in lieu of gdsx as this residual would be 
stripped off the effect of all the common factors. 
(4) Use the predicted value of goods trade in (3) or its lagged values as an explanatory variable in 
our model for bilateral services trade.  
 
We tried out these alternatives in turn with the following results:  
 
(1) Our simultaneous equation system predicted both bilateral goods and bilateral services trade 
very well (R-squared of 99% in each case). The estimation however inflated the coefficient on GDSX 
and deflated those on GDPk in predicting bilateral services trade. The latter were in fact returned with 
negative and significant signs! The results remained equally unsound if the model was run separately 
for intra-EU and all other trading partners in our sample. Given that 75% of global trade is 
merchandise trade, the estimation of goods trade thus seems to swamp that of services trade in a 
simultaneous equation system, which therefore seems to account for such a result.   
 
(2) For our IV model, we used time taken to import goods as an instrument for bilateral goods 
trade. We also tried other instruments like tariffs and costs of an import container but found these to 
be less correlated with bilateral goods trade than time taken to import36. In this IV estimation, bilateral 
goods trade had an elasticity of 2.7 but was insignificant. GDPk also had insignificant but large 
negative elasticities37. These results are possibly on account of our choice of the instrument, which 
may be not as independent of our dependent variable as one would want. At least, 25% of all bilateral 
services trade flows are transportation services and import time would therefore be negatively related 
with these38 39.    
 
(4) The predicted value of goods trade from the bilateral goods trade estimation had a coefficient 
of -0.276 as an explanatory variable for bilateral services trade. Lagged values of goods trade, even as 
far back as 10 years, were strongly correlated with current values of bilateral services trade. Thus, 
using them as an explanatory variable would lead to the same endogeneity problems that we were 
trying to account for in the first place.  
 
(3) But the residual from the bilateral goods trade estimation had a coefficient of 0.4 and was also 
significant at 1%, which suggests that the marginal impact of bilateral goods exports on bilateral 
services exports is 40%, ceteris paribus and on average. This residual is what we thus used in our 
final empirical estimations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Even this had a low statistical correlation of -0.257 with bilateral goods trade.  
37 For intra-EU trading partners in our sample, the coefficient on goods export remained negative and 
insignificant. For the other remaining trading partners, the coefficient on goods export remained insignificant 
but became positive (0.46).     
38 Data in fact confirmed this. The correlation coefficient between time taken to import and bilateral services 
exports was -0.2276. 
39 Lennon (2006), however, used tariffs as an instrument for goods trade and got results in the right direction, 
but she included only “other commercial services” (OCS) in her analysis. 
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Table A1: List of exporters and importers 
 
Exporters: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and USA. 
 
Importers: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Benelux, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, USA and Venezuela. 
 
 
Table A2:  Snapshot of services restrictiveness indices across countries 
and sub-sectors
 
COUNTRY AIR 
TRANSPORT 
BANKING DISTRIBUTION ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION 
MARITIME PROFESSIONAL TELECOM 
Argentina 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArE) 1997 
Australia 1995 1997, 2005 1999, 2005 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997, 2005 
Austria 1995 1997 1999 1999 n.a. 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Belgium 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Brazil 1995 1997, 2004 1999, 2004 1999 2001 1999 (AArE) 1997, 2004 
Canada 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Chile 1995 1997, 2004 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArE) 1997, 2004 
Hong Kong 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Colombia 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (A) 1997 
Denmark 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Finland 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
France 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Germany 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Greece 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
India 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Indonesia 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Ireland 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Italy 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Japan 1995 1997, 2005 1997, 2005 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997, 2005 
Korea 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Luxemburg 1995 1997 1999 1999 n.a. 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Malaysia 1995 1997, 2003 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997, 2002 
Mexico 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Netherlands 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
New Zealand 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Peru 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (A) 1997 
Philippines 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Portugal 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Russia 1995 2004 2004 1999 2001 2004 (E) 1997 
Singapore 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
South Africa 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArE) 1997 
Spain 1995 1997 1999 1999 n.a. 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Sweden 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Switzerland 1995 1997 1999 1999 n.a. 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Thailand 1995 1997, 2004 1999, 2002 1999, 2002 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997, 2004 
Turkey 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
USA 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
UK 1995 1997 1999 1999 2001 1999 (AArEL) 1997 
Vietnam 1995 2004 2004 1999, 2004 2001 2004 (AArEL) 1997, 2004 
Source:  Dee (2005) 
Note: A = Accountancy; Ar = Architectural; E = Engineering; and L = Legal Services 
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